

Turkish Model in Somalia: Civilian Power Approach in State Building Process



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Abstract

The international community's intervention in fragile or failed states mostly is welcomed. But on the other hand, the external intervention revolves around the interest, ideas, strategies and the policies of the intervener. This study explores Turkish model in Somalia's state building and argues that the engagement in civilian power with humanitarian and development assistance, is more effective than coercive military intervention. Turkey's civilian power approach has a positive impact on Somali state building process, such as peace building and political process, enhancing the capacity of state institutions and socioeconomic development of the country.

Keywords: State building, Civilian power, development, Somalia, Turkey

“No one can speak of peace, justice and civilization in the world if the outcry rising from Somalia is left unheard... This is why we have launched a comprehensive aid campaign for Somalia... We are making every effort to carry out infrastructure investments that will enable Somalia to stand on its feet. We are also working unrelentingly to help provide an environment of political stability and peace conducive to sustainable development”.

*Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the UN General Assembly,
22 September 2011*

1. Introduction

The end of the Cold War marked the evolution of fragile and failed states as a consequence of falling military regimes and losing legitimacy (Huria, 2009: 1). Chaos and civil wars erupted in some countries due to the collapse of state institutions. As these civil conflicts increased, the international support to help restore stability and rebuild the fragile states augmented as well.

After the independence of Somalia in 1960,¹ civilian democratic governments ruled the country and Somalia was viewed as a model of a successful democracy in Africa, as peaceful and successful elections had been held in the country. However, military coup d'etat ended the civilian rule, and the country came under a military dictatorship from 1969 to 1991. In the 1980s, armed rebellion opposed the government, and the country plunged into a civil war that ousted the regime in January 1991. After the collapse of the central government, the armed opposition groups failed to reach a national agreement, and that is led to a power struggle among the warring factions. The whole state institutions collapsed, and the country entered an era of political and administrative vacuum. Several

efforts to salvage the country have been made by the international community by working closely with the neighboring countries to restore peace and stability in the country. The first inception of the transitional government was formed in 2000, but, that did not become fully functional due to combined factors.

Somalia, as a case of this study, has been without a fully functioning government for over two decades, despite obvious efforts to restore peace and stability in the country. By examining the role of the international community in Somalia, concentrating merely on hard power as the main policy instrument to rebuild the state has been less effective and taken longer time than was expected, and in some ways has resulted in counterproductive outcomes. Instead of that Turkey's approach has been more effective within a short period. This study will scrutinize the strategies and means of Turkey to rebuild the Somali state. The study will exclusively examine the Turkey's role of state building in Somalia as a viable strategy for intervening fragile situations of post-conflict societies.

The study is structured into two main sections. The first section presents the international efforts to stabilize Somalia since 1991, while the second section examines the Turkey's civilian power approach in Somalia state building. This paper is extracted and developed from the master thesis by the author on "The Role of Turkish Civilian Power in Somalia State Building Process". Before going down to the analysis of the study, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of civilian power and its role in state building concepts.

2. The Concepts of Civilian Power and State Building

The concept of civilian power was first used by Francois Duchene in 1970s to describe the civilian power Europe as a distinctive role for Europe to emphasize mainly on low politics, non-state actors, ideational influence and international interdependence (Orbie, 2006: 124). Duchene

indicated the foreign policy of the European Community to be an exemplar of a new period in political civilization by increasing its international influence using civilian power means. Although the Duchene' concept had not obtained much popularity in his earlier suggestions, however, the concept has received considerable attention in academic literature in recent years. As the meaning of the concept gives laterally, civilian power is non-military actions such as economic, diplomatic and cultural policy instruments, which in turn is different from military power force, which refers to the use of armed forces (Smith, 2005: 1). Smith suggests that any civilian power need to meet the following four criteria: means, ends, use of persuasion, and civilian control over foreign (and defense) policy making (Smith, 2005: 2). In other words, civilian power promotes to engage in diplomacy rather than coercive instruments and focuses on mediation to resolve conflicting parties, uses economic solutions to political problems, and considers the importance of indigenous peoples to determine their own fate in resolving the international seizures (Hill, 1983 qtd. in William: 5).

The second concept which needs to be defined in this study is state building. A number of definitions have been given by scholars, which gave different meanings to the term of the state. In this study, we adopt a comprehensive definition which combines the institutional presence of the state, the capacity to provide service, and the state-society relations, all, as significant elements of the state. The international community supports fragile and failed states,² to rebuild the capacity of public institutions, and mediate between political rivalries.³

State building as a broad concept, it was defined as “an endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions, and legitimacy of the state driven by state–society relations” (OECD, 2011: 20). As a broad concept, there are four significant aspects that the international community supports to increase the resilience of the state, namely: 1) political settlement and the

political process through which state and society are connected; 2) enhancing the capability and responsiveness of the state to fulfill its principal functions and provide key services effectively; 3) building social expectations and perceptions about what the state should do, what the terms of the state-society relationships should be, and the ability of society to articulate demands that are “heard”; and finally, 4) peace building which is commonly defined as activities by national or international actors to prevent violent conflict to institutionalize peace (OECD, 2011: 30).

Although Somalia -as our case study- is labeled ‘failed state’ since 1991, however, the country has shown signs of recovery and improvement in the last years. The state institutions are rebuilding, and the government capability has increased. Therefore, this study uses the term ‘fragile’ instead of ‘failed’ state, to describe the Somali state building process.

The civilian power actors’ actions to influence the state building process in fragile and post-conflict states have been discussed enormously in the academic literature in recent years. The international community agreed to develop a joint policy to deal with the challenges posed by fragile states, and adopted a new comprehensive program to deal with the fragile situations “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States”. This deal, which was supported by the donors and affected countries, aims at five state building goals which are (1) building legitimate politics, (2) enhancing security, (3) improving justice institutions (4) building economic foundations and (5) increasing revenues & services (Jörn Grävingholt, 2012: 1). Although this program was adopted, yet one country’s intervention into another country to support, always promotes the ideas and values of the intervening country’s foreign policy instruments (Yoo, 2011: 1). As many international actors step up to assist the state building of fragile states, the success to accomplish goals of the mission and the acceptance of the recipient would always be different from one actor to another on account of the strategies, priorities and the means employed by

the foreign policy of these actors to resolve a conflict. Civilian power actors, unlike military powers, support the state building of fragile states, as they concentrate on non-military, primarily economic means, to resolve conflicts (Smith, 2005: 1).

Many international efforts to support fragile states failed due to merely employing coercive methods and military actions against the conflicting parties (Yoo, 2011: 111). By engaging in diplomatic reconciliation rather than coercive instruments, employing humanitarian and development assistance mechanism to all warring parts, the centrality of mediation in conflict resolution, and the importance of economic solutions to political problems, (Christopher Hill, 1983: 310-11; Trott, 2010: 5), civilian powers support the state building in fragile situations, according to these central ideas. Various studies suggest that coherent and well communicated incentives by the external actors, unlike military actions, clearly indicate which actions provoke positive or negative sensations and thus enhance[s] the leverage of external actors' measures to support state building (Jörn Grävingholt, 2012: 34).

Since the early 2000s, the Turkish foreign policy to fragile states seems to adopt civilian power intervention, in most cases, to achieve its desired ambition to enhance its role as an international actor.⁴

3. Somalia State Building and International Community

Soon after state collapse in 1991, the international community stormed to help rebuilding of the Somali state. Despite the fact that the United Nations, the African Union and IGAD, and the Arab League attempted to restore stability in the country; however, none of these efforts have ever succeeded to achieve stability in Somalia. Since 1991, the international community has made several attempts to rebuild the Somali state but has failed to yield its desired result as they mainly concentrate on military power.

The first attempt was after the UN Security Council authorized an international intervention led by United Nation Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM1) which started on 24th April 1992, to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu;⁵ and protect UN humanitarian workers in Somalia, (UN, 2003). As the situation on the ground deteriorated, the mission was replaced by a US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF),⁶ also known as the ‘Operation Restore Hope’. The mandate of the mission was to employ all the necessary means to protect the humanitarian convoys, humanitarian assistance centers, and other peace-enforcement operations, (UN, 2003).⁷

In March 1993, the UN Security Council decided under the resolution 814 (1993) a transition from UNITAF to a new United Nations peacekeeping operation -- UNOSOM II with 28,000 military and civilian personnel to extend the mission throughout the country (United Nations, 2003). The mandate of the new mission included: preventing further violence and taking appropriate action when it is necessary; maintaining control of heavy weapons, seizing the small arms, and securing seaports, airports and all lines of communications of the country to restore stability, law and order, (United Nations, 2003). The operation failed due to an intense battle with some factions of Somalia’s warlords and resulted in the complete withdrawal of the United Nations forces from Somalia in early March 1995.

The Second attempt was the US-backed Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006 when the Union of Islamic Courts seized control of Southern and Central Somalia.⁸ As part of its global counterterrorism war, the United States tacitly supported Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006 in a bid to overthrow the Islamists from power (Lone, 2006).⁹ However, due to the historical hostility between Ethiopian and Somalis, the Ethiopian troops further deteriorated the situation and emboldened the radical elements of the Union of Islamic Courts. The Secretary General of the UN recognized that the political and security situation in Somalia is “further complicated by regional and international factors; including the proliferation of arms, the potential use of Somalia as a stage for a proxy war among neighbours...” (UN Security Council, 2008, para.22).

The third attempt was the deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), under the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on 19th January 2007, and authorized by the UN Security Council on 20th February 2007, with the mandate to support the Somalia Federal Government. The twenty-two thousand uniformed AMISOM personnel (both military and police), contributed by ten African countries, including Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe have been in Somalia since 2007, (AMISOM). The European Union and other international actors have been investing billions of dollars for more than a decade in which AMISOM has been active in Somalia. Although the mission of AMISOM has made some progress, it has not achieved the desired objectives as the security threats are still active. The mission's heavy reliance on military solution; its inclusion of the front line states, especially Ethiopia & Kenya; and the negligence to invest enough in the Somalia security services have all proved less effective.

Although the international community has made several efforts for the last twenty years and achieved relative progress in Somalia's state building, however, these actions have not yet yielded a stable Somalia. The country is still an example of a state failure.

4. Turkey's Civilian Approach to Somalia State Building Process

With the collapse of the Somali government in 1991, Turkey was among the first of international coalition to send troops to Somalia to restore stability in the country. Lieutenant General Çevik Bir, a Turkish military commander, was appointed as force commander of the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) II (International Crisis Group, 2012: 2), to lead 28,000 military and civilian police personnel from 34 countries¹⁰ between April 1993 - January 1994 (United Nations, 2003).

Although Turkey, along with the United Nations operation made attempts to employ a civilian approach to mediate between the political rivalries, the mission ultimately failed, and did not yield a lasting peace in Somalia, as it had merely relied on foreign troops to secure and build a lasting peace. Finally, Turkey along with the United Nations troops withdrew from the country in March 1995 as the situation worsened.

The second attempt of Turkey's involvement in Somalia was in 2011 when Turkey responded to the humanitarian crisis that hit the East African region generally and Somalia in particular.¹¹ Although this intervention was mainly motivated by humanitarian morality, Turkey's post-2011 strategy has undertaken a civilian power approach by adopting an impartial choice from the political rivalries and by using diplomacy to mediate, and provide humanitarian and development assistance to all parts of the country, as well as building the state through infrastructure and institutional development.

4.1 Humanitarian and Development Aid

Today Turkish efforts in Somalia range from humanitarian to development and peace building. The catastrophic drought that hit Somalia in 2011 as a result of the prolonged civil war became a catalyst for the Turkish involvement in Somalia. To draw the attention of the world to the precarious situation of Somalia, the then prime minister of Turkey, Erdoğan, along with a large delegation including his wife and daughter, then foreign minister and other ministers and executives, visited in August 2011 which drew world's attention to the tragic humanitarian crises (Mehmet Özkan 2014: 22).

Turkey has launched a variety of campaign and sent a significant amount of aid to Somalia to ease the humanitarian disaster in Somalia. Turkey's engagement in Somalia has been remarkably unique as government

organizations, the private sector and local municipalities working towards a common goal have involved in the humanitarian and development efforts (Mehmet Özkan 2014: 22). Unlike universally accepted humanitarian definition which is mainly saving lives and alleviating the suffering of crisis-affected populations, the Turkish understanding of the concept is much broader than that by including the sense of human sympathy to its humanitarian assistance (Binder & Erten, 2013: 7). This approach combines the development assistance as motivated by the concept of human compassion. (Binder & Erten, 2013: 7). This broader notion has assisted Somalia to recover slowly due to the massive investment projects coming in the name of humanity. For instance, while many international humanitarian organizations were involved in providing relief services in Somalia, the Turkish state institutions and NGOs were building roads, hospitals, schools and other development projects alongside the humanitarian operations as part of human sympathy.

Turkey has pumped millions of dollars of humanitarian and development aid in Somalia since 2011 as table 1 shows.¹²

Table 1: Turkish Aid to Somalia (2011 – 2015)

Year	Amount of aid In millions \$	Somalia in the rank of Turkey's aid recipient
2011	93.39	4 th
2012	86.61	5 th
2013	115.74	4 th
2014	74.40	4 th
2015	314.82	2 nd
Total	684.96	

Source: TIKA, 'Turkish Development Assistance Reports of 2015, 2014, 2013, 2012, 2011' http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/publication/list/turkish_development_assistance_reports-24, accessed 20 June 2017.

Years without functioning government, the Somali people, who are known for their exceptional entrepreneurship skills, have managed to revive the country's economy by creating domestic and international business links despite the security challenge. As the role of the state in the country's economy has been limited, the key economic infrastructure was left without development for an extended period. For that reason, the development aid that Turkey has been pumping into Somalia went mainly to infrastructure development. In fact, Turkey sent at least 50 construction machines and trucks to Mogadishu, (Anadolu Ajansi, 2012), to be used for infrastructure development.

The Turkish infrastructure development activities in Somalia include: first: Mogadishu Friendship Road. As promised by then Prime Minister, President Erdoğan during his visit to Mogadishu in 2011, TIKA has constructed a 23km long road with 20-30m in width, the dual way road connects the airport to the city center and the presidential palace as one of the most important roads in the city. Besides that, TIKA installed 736 new lighting posts in the newly constructed road, (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 2013: 45).

Furthermore, in collaboration with the Turkish General Directorate of State Airports Authority, TIKA has reconstructed the buildings of the airport terminals, installed VOR devices and trained airport personnel, transforming it into a fully functioning airport (TIKA, 2012: 274). On the other hand, TIKA constructed Mogadishu Civil Aviation Training Center in 2015 which is significant to enhancing the capacity of the Somali civil aviation sector.

Turkey extended its development assistance to all regions as a sign of impartiality from political rivalries. TIKA, for instance, has implemented development and humanitarian projects, besides Mogadishu, in Hargeisa, Berbera, Galkayo, Baidoa, and Kismayo. Consequently, the footprint of the Turkish projects could be seen in different regions of the country.

4.2 Enhancing Access to Social Services

Another area that Turkey greatly contributes to the stability of Somalia is enhancing access to social services. Despite the fact that civil society organizations and the private sector have positively contributed there, the social services sector faces many challenges concerning access to and availability and quality of the required social services.

Regarding the education, the Turkish state institutions and NGOs work in close collaboration with the Somali Ministry of Education to improve the country's education system. New schools have been constructed, others have been repaired.¹³

To enhance the capacity of the higher education institutions in Somalia, TIKA has supported several universities and schools working in higher education with educational equipment and facilities.¹⁴ Turkey also implemented vocational centers in Somalia to train the young people and equip them with the necessary equipment.

In addition to the schools, several Turkish state institutions and NGOs have provided scholarships to Somalis students. In the first two years of Turkey's involvement in Somalia, nearly \$70 million has been allocated to 1,200 Somali students, (Harte, 2012) to study in Turkey with a full scholarship, while the number has been increasing for the last years. However, the most prominent institutions are the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK), Diyanet, KIMSE YOK MU and NILE Organization.¹⁵ These institutions have provided scholarships in high schools and university levels. Beside the full scholarships provided to study in Turkey, there are semiannual and annual scholarship programs granted to the Somalis.

Regarding the health service, Turkey has done an enormous endeavor, as its assistance in Somalia is more visible in the health sector than any other field. New hospitals and a nursing school have been built, while others have been renovated. The hospitals built or renovated include, but not limited to, the 200-bed Erdoğan Research and Training Hospital, which is the most modern hospital in Somalia; the 100-bed Mother and Child Hospital; the 62-bed Shifa Hospital, and the 50-bed Deva International Training and Research Hospital which was later transformed as part of Erdoğan Research and Training Hospital. The other health facilities constructed or repaired include the Berbera Hospital, the Galkayo hospital and 40 classrooms of the School of Nursing in Mogadishu. There are also other field hospitals built by either Turkish NGOs or supported by Turkish state institutions. Besides the hospitals, several training programs have been conducted both in Somalia and Turkey. Likewise, significant numbers of Turkish doctors have visited Somalia to assist while Somali internship students have been brought to Turkey for medical training purposes.

4.3 Enhancing the Capacity of the State Institutions

As the state institutions collapsed during the civil war, the Somali government is facing the challenge of rebuilding almost all state institutions from scratch. Effective and functioning institutions are crucial for the country's good governance, stability, and recovery from the years of anarchy. In this regard, the international community has been working with the Somali government to reinstate the key institutions of the government. As part of these international efforts, Turkey has played a unique role in rebuilding Somalia's state institutions. Most of the key Turkish government institutions have partnered with their Somali counterparts to help them in rebuilding efforts and provide expertise where needed. Somalia has considerably benefited from this capacity building relationship of an institution to institution, such as ministry to ministry, parliament to parliament, municipality to municipality, and so on.

The state capacity building activities undertaken by Turkey in Somalia include a provision of training to the government personnel, equipping and rebuilding the infrastructure of the state institutions such as the government buildings, and direct financial support to the government.

While institution capacity building activities are largely involved by many international actors, the study takes three excellent examples of Turkey's involvement in that area.

4.3.1 Direct Budget Support to the Somali Government

Upon a request from President Hassan Sheikh, the Turkish foreign ministry started a direct cash support to the Somali government during June-December 2013. The \$ 4.5 million, as an aid package monthly payment, (Keydmedia, 2014) was given to Somalia. According to Turkish Official Development Assistance, Turkey delivered 15 million USD to the Somalia government in a direct budget support, (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 2013: 12). At the end of 2013, there were rumors published by some media outlets that Turkey had cut the direct cash to Somalia. However, Turkish Ministry of foreign affairs reaffirmed in a press statement the intention to continue the budget support for the year of 2014, (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). In May 2016, the Turkish president signed a protocol to give 24 million budget supports to Somali government (Huriyet Daily New, 2016). The direct budget support has helped the Somali government to pay the salary of its public personnel on a regular basis and carry out its state building activities.

4.3.2 Enhancing Key Government Institutions

Turkish state institutions and NGOs have been working with the Somali government to deliver social services. For instance, the Istanbul Municipality and other Turkish institutions cooperate with the Mogadishu

Municipality in urban transformation and development, building key roads, and improving the sanitation of the city. Another institutional support is building Information Technology infrastructures for the Somali Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2013, the Somalia ministry of foreign affairs signed an agreement with its Turkish counterpart to help construct Information Technology infrastructures to create a secure channel of communication between the ministry and its embassies all over the world. Under the project, all kinds of hardware, software and training needs will be met by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As the agreement has been implemented, there have been a number of trainings for the ministry staff in Turkey (Radio Muqdisho, 2014).

4.3.3 Training the Government personnel

Turkey supports the Somalia government with the training of its civil servants. A number of trainings have been carried out both in Somalia and Turkey. Notably, employees from the Somalia Presidency, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mogadishu Municipality and other key government institutions have been sent to Turkey for several times. For instance, a total of ten diplomats from Somalia were trained in Turkey, in March 23 - 29, 2014 in the Diplomacy Academy, (Diplomasi Akademisi, 2014b). Three officials from the Somali presidency office have been trained in 'protocol rules and practices' between September 30 – October 05, 2013, in Turkey, as they also had meetings with the Directorate of Protocol of Turkish Presidency and the Directorate of Protocol of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to observe the practice of protocol rules, (Diplomasi Akademisi, 2013). Similar protocol trainings were also organized in Mogadishu by the Academy between 9 and 13 February in 2015 for the protocol staff of the Presidency (Diplomasi Akademisi, 2014a). The above-mentioned trainings are merely notable examples of institutional capacity buildings.

4.4 Security and Peace Building Efforts

Security is the primary challenge facing the Somali government. Security is also critical for the international community's re-engagement and foreign investment in the country. Although the international community has spent billions of dollars to support AMISOM, it was criticized for not investing enough in the Somali security services and national army. Turkey, which has no ground troops in Somalia, attempts to improve the capacity of security institutions using civilian power. In this regard, Turkey and Somalia signed the first deal of military cooperation on May 22, 2010. According to the signed document, the cooperation includes military logistics, training, and peace support, (Today's Zaman, 2012).

Police and intelligence training has been conducted in Somalia and Turkey. The first batch of Somali police personnel was sent to Turkey for capacity building training between 29 June and 16 July 2012, (Meydanistanbul, 2012). A total of sixty police members comprising forty-eight men, five women, and seven administrators had undergone serious training at Arnavutköy police training center in Istanbul.

Regarding a long-term strategy of Somalia's stability, Turkey is assisting the Somali armed forces as another major security sector. The Somali government has been lobbying the international community to consider building a Somali army as its greatest strategy to achieve a full control of the security that leads to long-term stability for the country. While giving support to the African mission in Somalia, Turkey started to invest mainly in the Somali army. In 2013, the first batch of such groups from the Somalia army was transported to Turkey for a yearlong military training. A total of 110 Somali military officers, comprising 58 officers, and 52 noncommissioned Officers (NCOs), graduated in the summer of 2014 following ten months of intensive military training in Turkey, (Haberler, 2014). As that training was the first successful batch, another 103 Somali military officials are in Turkey to be trained for land, sea and air defense (Radio Muqdisho, 2015).

While these pieces of trainings contribute significantly to the quantity and the quality of the army, police and the intelligence services, it was realized that there was a need for a broader strategy to rebuild the infrastructures of the country's security institutions, which had collapsed during the civil war, to build a homegrown effective security services, to achieve long term stability. In this regard, Turkey has recently finalized the construction of a Turkish Military Base in Mogadishu which occupies 400 hectares and houses three military schools, dormitories, and depots. It has the capacity to train 500 soldiers at a time and will be used to train troops from Somalia and other African countries (Anadolu Agency, 13/10/2016).

Turkey also supports with direct cash to the African Union's Somalia Peacekeeping Force in the context of peace-building, (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 2013: 138).

4.5 Mediation

Although Turkey recognizes and respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia, it has enjoyed good relations with all actors of Somalia's political process, including Somaliland, a self-declared independent entity which has not been internationally recognized yet; where even Turkey managed to open a consulate in Hargeisa. On the other hand, Turkey hosted Somaliland and the Federal Government for talks several times.

April 13, 2013, Turkey organized a Somali Conference for Somali president, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, and Somaliland president Ahmed Mohamed 'Silanyo', in Ankara in an effort to reach a political settlement. After negotiations and diplomacy in separate as well as trilateral meetings with then Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu, then Prime Minister Erdoğan and then President Gül, the two Somali leaders concluded and agreed on Ankara Communiqué on 13th April 2013 (Mehmet Özkan 2014: 22).¹⁶

4.6 Somali problem at International Stage

Despite the fact that Somalia, at the international stage, was regarded as a no-go zone due to the security risks, then Prime Minister Erdoğan of Turkey led a delegation comprised of more than 200 political, business and cultural elites to Somalia together with his family in August 2011. His visit responded not only to the humanitarian tragedy but also drew the international attention to Somalia. Mogadishu, which was once called by the international media ‘the most dangerous city’ in the world, experienced the biggest foreign delegation in more than two decades. Despite the incessant warnings from some of the Western countries to their citizens from traveling to Somalia, or parts of it, due to security threats in Mogadishu, Erdoğan upstaged the international community in daring to take a lead and bringing together, some of his family, the key Ministers of his cabinet, civil society and state institutions to Somalia. President Erdoğan visited Somalia again in January 2015 and June 2016, as another major boost for Somalia’s international profile.

Speaking at the United Nations on 22 September 2011, a month after his visit to Mogadishu, Erdoğan allocated half of his UN General Assembly speech to Somalia. Speaking passionately about the Somalia crisis, urging the world leaders the need for a collective international response to the Horn of African war-torn country to restore stability and rebuild the state.

In another major move to take the Somalia case to the international desk, the Turkish government hosted several high-level international conferences on Somalia in Istanbul, seeking a comprehensive international solution for the Somali problem. The first conference took place in Istanbul from 21-23 May 2010, with delegations representing over fifty states. The three-day conference, co-convened by the United Nations and Turkey was intended to promote the Somalia’s economic investment. A proposed Taskforce by the Islamic Development Bank to bring together all development partners and agencies to respond to Somalia's critical needs pending the stabilization of the country, was agreed to be chaired by the government of Turkey.

The second conference that Turkey hosted was the Islamic Cooperation Conference on Somalia. As the worst humanitarian crisis in three decades hit East Africa, Turkey called an emergency Ministerial-level meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Istanbul on 17th August 2011, in order to raise awareness of the Somalia's famine crisis and seek a collective response. The Participation of the then President Gul, then Prime Minister Erdoğan and then Foreign Minister, Davutoglu, showed the significance of Turkey's effort to boost the Somali case to the international level. Speaking at the conference, Erdoğan announced his intention to go to Somalia.

The third conference hosted by Turkey on Somalia took place in Istanbul from 31st May to 1st June 2012. The two-day conference, which was a follow-up to the one previously held in Istanbul on 2010, focused on building a long-term solution to the Somalia's chronic state failure. Under the theme of "Preparing Somalia's Future: Goals for 2015", Turkey invited the Somali government leadership, regional administrations, and civil society representatives, as well as the international community to discuss building a long-term multi-dimensional solution for Somalia's future. Attended by representatives from 57 countries and eleven international and regional organizations, the conference made another significant step toward Somalia's backing in the eyes of the international community for state building support. As a host of the conference and a major donor, Turkey proposed the establishment of a new 'Rebuilding and Restructuring Fund for the Somalia Security' in which the conference endorsed the initiative to proceed.

4.7 Main Features of Turkish Model in Somalia

Turkish approach has used multifaceted state building model tackling the Somali crisis from various angles, and its efforts range from humanitarian to development and peace building. This engagement has been effective as government organizations, the private sector and local municipalities involved in the state building process. Below there is analysis of Turkey's approach and engagement to state building in Somalia.

Table 2: Turkish Approach to State Building in Somalia

Feature	Approach	Outcome
Humanitarian, development and state building operations	Direct aid delivery through presence on the ground	Efficient, cost-effective, rapid; needs based; more visibility
Alignment with Somali government`s Priorities	Coordinating and planning with national government and local counterparts	Increased Somali ownership
Interventionism and conditionality	Non-interference; no direct policy conditionalities	Empowering state institutions; little Accountability
Drivers of Engagement	Humanitarianism and solidarity, soft power ¹⁷	Focusing on mutual benefits & long terms
Focus of Cooperation	Humanitarian support, political engagement, infrastructure and development, and institution building	Emphasizing economic solutions to ease political and security pressures, enhanced local institutions
Coordination with other donors	Strong bilateralism and little coordination with other donors	Better promotion of Turkish visibility; closer relationship with host government
Modalities of financing and support	In-kind goods, public-private partnerships, direct budget support, grants, technical cooperation, support via NGOs	Support mobilized from a variety of public and private sources; increased potential for sustained financing

Source: Besharati, Neissan and others. South-South Peace building: Lessons and Insights from Turkey and South Africa`s Support to Fragile States; with modifications by the author.

5. Conclusion

It is noteworthy to mention that Turkish civilian power could not be effective in Somalia without the presence of the military forces of AMISOM. Therefore, my argument here is not that civilian power is an alternative to a military intervention, but rather it is that merely military power cannot bring a solution for failed states without coupling with civilian power.

After decades of conflict and state failure, the international community should consider, and rethink past strategies and policies adopted toward state building in Somalia. While hard power and military policy instruments have already prioritized, the international community should look other ways such as a civilian approach and its appropriate role in the state-building process.

By coordinating its state and civil society institutions, Turkey adopted different multifaceted approach by investing huge humanitarian and development assistance and building the Somali state through infrastructure and institutional development. Turkey has played a distinctive role in rebuilding Somalia`s state institutions in a way that contributes effectively to the stability and development of the country. Turkey also played a mediating role in Somalia while keeping its impartiality and its presence in Somalia. For this regard, unlike any other country, Turkey has received huge support and sympathy from the Somalis.

As Somalia is located in a strategic position in the Horn of Africa, the Turkey`s growing role should be careful about the suspicion of regional and global actors. Therefore Turkey`s involvement should avoid a geopolitical rivalry, which could hinder the effectiveness of its efforts in Somalia.

Finally, this study recommends further research on the lessons learned and experiences on state/peace building efforts in Somalia. Such lessons are significant not to repeat the past mistakes, and could, also, be of advantage for state/peace building cases in other fragile or post-conflict countries.

Notes

- ¹ Somalia gained independence in 1960 after amalgamation between the former British Somaliland Protectorate which became independent from the UK on June 26, 1960, and Trust Territory of Somaliland under Italian administration, which became independent on July 1, 1960. Together they united and formed the Somali Republic on July 1, 1960.
- ² States fail or become fragile as they run out to perform and loose legitimacy. The state becomes fragile when it has weak capacity to carry out basic functions of governing a population and its territory.
- ³ For more discussion, refer to Addow, 2015, p.10.
- ⁴ For more details, refer to Addow, 2015: 14-19
- ⁵ The two main Somali factions in Mogadishu reached an agreement of ceasefire and cessation of hostilities under auspices of United Nations. In accordance with the agreements, the ceasefire was to be monitored by a group of fifty unarmed uniformed United Nations military observers.
- ⁶ In addition to the United States forces, UNITAF included military units from Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and Zimbabwe
- ⁷ The first elements of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), spearheaded by the United States, were deployed in Mogadishu on 9 December 1992. In the following weeks UNITAF forces expanded their operations to major relief centers in Somalia. UNITAF's principal goal was to establish a secure environment for urgent humanitarian assistance. Once that was accomplished, the military command would then be turned over to the United Nations.
- ⁸ There is a great debate about the (il)legality and the purpose of Ethiopian intervention. For more discussion, please refer to Khayre, Ahmed Ali. (2014) “*Self-Defence Intervention by Invitation, or Proxy war? The Legality of the 2006 Ethiopian Invasion of Somalia*” African Journal of International and Comparative Law 22.2 (2014): 208–233. Edinburgh University Press, UK.

- ⁹ As part of its global counter terrorism war, the United States instigated a proxy war in Somalia by supporting first local warlords with funds and asking them to capture suspected terrorists (Mark Mazzetti, Efforts by C.I.A Fail in Somalia, Officials Charge, *New York Times*, June 2006, available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/08/world/africa/08intel.html>); and then gave Ethiopian a greenlight to invade the country.
- ¹⁰ Contributors of Military and Civilian Police Personnel of UNOSOM II were Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United States, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
- ¹¹ The historical relations between Somalia and Turkey went through different periods, starting from the Ottoman time to the Somalia's modern ages of independence, to the state collapse and 2011 humanitarian crises in the horn of Africa. The revitalizing of the relations returns to 2007 after the meeting of then Prime Minister Erdoğan with the Somali President, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. The former president of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) Sharif Sheikh Ahmed visited Ankara on several occasions before Erdoğan's first visit to Somalia in August 2011 with large delegation; followed by another visit in January 2015 when Erdoğan announced projects that would consolidate relations between the two countries. His third time, he visited to Mogadishu on June 2016, to inaugurate Turkish Embassy's new building complex in Mogadishu, described it as "the number one complex in the world". In their period, both Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud visited Turkey several times, while the current president, Mohamed Abdullahi 'Farmajo', made his first visit to Turkey on April 2017.

Noticeably, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed (1934 –2012) was the president of Transitional Federal Government of Somalia from October 2004 – December 2008 where he resigned and succeeded by Sharif Sheikh Ahmed (1966 -), who was the president of Transitional Federal Government of Somalia from January 2009 to August 2012. Sharif was succeeded by Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (1955 -) who was the president of the Federal Republic of Somalia

from September 2012 to February 2017, and succeeded by Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed "Farmajo" who was elected on February 2017.

- ¹² By working inside, and massively investing in economic infrastructure, the Turkish presence in Somalia has received huge support and sympathy from the Somalis, unlike any other country.
- ¹³ The schools, which were built or renovated by the Turkish state institutions or NGOs include, but not limited: Turkish Maarif Foundation Schools (previously named Bedir Turkish Secondary School), Anadolu Educational Center, Sheikh Sufi Imam Hatip secondary school, Agriculture school, fishing school, among others.
- ¹⁴ In 2012, TIKa provided 400 computers, 100 printers, overhead projects and generators to Somalia universities. In 2013, the total number of donated computers reached 600 computers.
- ¹⁵ NILE and KIMSE YOK MU are currently prohibited by the Somali government to operate in the country due to its alleged involvement in 15 July failed coup in Turkey.
- ¹⁶ The first talks between Somalia and Somaliland took place in London, UK on 21 June 2012, where both parties agreed to continue the dialogue. After a week, they met in Dubai on a presidential level for further talks and signed Dubai statement. Following UK and Dubai's mediation, Turkey has taken the lead in hosting both parties in Ankara to continue the discussions.
- ¹⁷ Turkish engagement increases bilateral trade and business investment opportunities for Turkish institutions. Also, it may be understood that Somalia has becoming the Turkish pivot into Africa for expanding its sphere of influence in the context of growing regional and global rivalries. For more details, please refer to Antonopoulos, Paul and others. (July 2017) "*Somalia: Turkey's Pivot to Africa in the Context of Growing Inter-Imperialist Rivalries*"; *Journal of Comparative Politics*, Volume 10, Number 2, (July 2017): 4-18. available at: <http://www.jofcp.org/assets/jcp/JCP-July-2017.pdf>.

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